Philosophy Faculty Works

Philosophy

Spring 2009

Philosophy and Theology: Notes on Jeff McMahan
Christopher Kaczor
Loyola Marymount University, Christopher.Kaczor@lmu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher Kaczor, “Philosophy and Theology” Notes on Jeff McMahan, National Catholic Bioethics
Quarterly 9.1 (Spring 2009): 185-191.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

Philosophy and Theology

The most intellectually sophisticated opponent of the pro-life position is
probably Jeff McMahan of Rutgers University. In recent articles, including “Killing Embryos for Stem Cell Research,” he seeks to deny two different fundamental
premises: “(1) The embryo is the earliest stage in the existence of someone like you
or me. That is, we were once embryos. (2) We have the same moral status at all
times at which we exist. We mattered just as much when we were embryos as we
do now” (Metaphilosophy, April 2007). Part of his argumentation rests on the claim
that “many of the moral reasons why we have to treat an individual in certain ways
and not treat that individual in other ways are given by that individual’s intrinsic
nature.” Indeed, the pro-life claim is that the human being is the same in nature
through various stages of life: embryonic, fetal, newborn, toddler, etc.
McMahan points out that we as a society have accepted assisted conception
via in vitro fertilization (IVF) even though as it is currently practiced, IVF involves
the creation of numerous surplus embryos that will be frozen (which likely means
death), will be the objects of lethal experimentation, or simply will not be implanted
and thus be allowed to die. If we as a society really believed that the embryo is a
human being having intrinsic value, then this practice would be viewed as deeply
problematic.
McMahan is largely correct, but his point is somewhat overstated insofar as
recognition of the problem of “surplus” embryos is indeed found in society. On
December 4, 2008, the New York Times, ran a story titled “Parents Torn Over Extra
Frozen Embryos from Fertility Procedures.” 1 A survey cited in the article indicates
discontent, mixed feelings, and conflict between spouses about what to do with fro-

1
Denise Grady, “Parents Torn over Extra Frozen Embryos from Fertility Procedures,”
New York Times, December 4, 2008, A22, A24.
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zen, so-called spare embryos. Some parents want to donate the embryos for research
purposes, but other parents compared the freezer storage to an orphanage. Others stop
paying to freeze the embryos and disappear. “They would rather have you pull the
trigger on the embryos,” said Dr. Mark V. Sauer, director of the Center for Women’s
Reproductive Care at Columbia University Medical Center, in the same New York
Times article. “It’s like, ‘I don’t want another baby, but I don’t have it in me; I have
too much guilt to tell you what to do, to have them discarded.”
For others, McMahan’s assessment does apply, but the point is rather trivial.
We, as a society, do not recognize the dignity of human life in the earliest stages of
development, legally or, for the most part, morally. We indeed endorse many practices that fail to accord to every human being his or her intrinsic value. This societal
consensus is part of what John Paul II called the culture of death. So the approval
of IVF and the approval of the killing of embryonic human beings reflect a similar
dehumanization of human life in its beginnings.
However, perhaps not just society but people committed to the basic equality of
all human beings likewise do not really act on this belief. McMahan alleges a “conspicuous failure of even the most ardent ‘pro-life’ activists to give frozen embryos
a chance at life by offering the use of their bodies for fetal gestation.”
McMahan seems unaware that some pro-life activists do not adopt embryos
because they view embryo adoption itself as morally impermissible.2 Other pro-life
activists have become adoptive parents to frozen embryos, and groups have also
organized two national centers to facilitate embryo adoption, the Snowflakes Embryo
Adoption Program and the National Embryo Donation Center. McMahan’s allegation
is, in a certain sense, beside the point. If people are not open to adopting newborns,
they may nevertheless, without hypocrisy, oppose infanticide. If people are not open
to adopting homeless teenagers, they may nevertheless, without hypocrisy, oppose
making use of them as sources for organ donation.
McMahan concedes, “Some opponents of hESC [human embryonic stem cell]
research do, of course, extend their opposition to assisted conception as well, at least
as it is currently practiced; but they seem to be a minority among the opponents
of hESC research. For the majority, acceptance of assisted conception as practiced
casts doubt on their commitment to the second of the two assumptions stated earlier.”
He offers no evidence to support the view that a majority of opponents of human
embryonic stem cell research accept IVF. Indeed, I cannot think of a single critic of
embryonic destruction who supports IVF as currently practiced, in which “surplus”
embryos are created never to be implanted in their mothers. Certainly, Catholics who

Examples of various positions on the ethics of embryo adoption may be found in,
Thomas V. Berg and Edward J. Furton, eds., Human Embryo Adoption: Biotechnology,
Marriage, and the Right to Life (Philadelphia and Thornwood, NY: The National Catholic
Bioethics Center and The Westchester Institute for Ethics & the Human Person, 2006); and
Sarah Vaughan Brakman and Darlene Fozard Weaver, eds., The Ethics of Embryo Adoption
and the Catholic Tradition: Moral Arguments, Economic Reality, Social Analysis (New
York: Springer, 2008).
2
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accept the Church’s teaching on life issues not only oppose IVF for this reason, but
also oppose IFV in its very principle.3
Recognizing that the phenomena of twinning does not undermine the view that
conception is the beginning of a unique individual human being (individuality does
not require indivisibility), McMahan offers a different reason based on twinning for
thinking that a human zygote cannot be the beginning of a new human life:
The embryo is someone like you or me and if it matters in the way you and
I do (the two assumptions), then when symmetrical twinning occurs and an
embryo ceases to exist, this should be tragic. For it is the ceasing to exist of
someone who matters. According to the two assumptions, therefore, there is
a serious moral reason to try to prevent monozygotic twinning from occurring. Or at least we should try to ensure that all instances of twinning involve
asymmetrical division, so that no one ceases to exist. But these suggestions
are absurd, and I know of no one who believes either.

But why should we hold that the original twin has gone out of existence rather than
that one twin has arisen from the original? McMahan states further that
when an embryo divides to form twins, if the division is symmetrical, the
original embryo also ceases to exist. The original embryo cannot be identical with both twins, since one thing cannot be numerically identical with
two things that are not identical with each other. And if the division is symmetrical, the original embryo cannot be one twin but not the other, for there
is nothing about one twin to identify it as the original embryo that is not also
true of the other.

This seems problematic, because McMahan moves from epistemological
ignorance to metaphysical certainty. If he is correct that there is nothing that we can
identify that is true of one twin but not the other, we cannot know which of the two
twins (if either) is identical with the original zygote. Therefore, we are not justified
in concluding that the original zygote has died, since one of them may very well
be identical to the original. As Stephen Napier, an ethicist at The National Catholic
Bioethics Center, points out, it is consistent with the empirical evidence to interpret
twinning as a form of asexual reproduction in which the original zygote gives rise
to another without ever falling out of existence.4
Even if we could know that the original zygote had ceased to exist in giving
rise to the twins, it would still not follow that we would have a moral duty to combat
twinning. Intervention in any given case of possible twinning would be virtually
impossible in natural conception, since couples normally do not know if or when
they conceive, let alone that they may be conceiving a zygote who will later become
identical twins. Further, the burdens of treatment and the benefits for others must also
be considered before determining if a particular treatment is reasonable to undertake

See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Dignitas Personae on
Certain Bioethical Questions (December 8, 2008), and ���������������������������������
Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith, Donum vitae (February 22, 1987).
4
Stephen Napier, “Twinning, Substance, and Identity through Time: A Reply to McMahan,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 8.2 (Summer 2008): 255–264.
3
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or to continue. Even in some cases where personhood is indisputably established, it
is unreasonable to provide life-saving treatment. It is not a tragedy or a moral failure
to fail to provide a heart transplant to a ninety-five year old woman, even though
she is undoubtedly a person. In this case, the burdens to the patient would likely be
considerable and the benefits slight. Indeed, in the case of the twins, it is a benefit to
at least one of them that a treatment to prevent twinning not be provided.
Finally, McMahan chides pro-life advocates for not campaigning for research
on ways of preventing the vast numbers of embryonic deaths due to spontaneous
miscarriage. McMahan claims (without citing any evidence) that about two thirds
of all embryos die prior to birth.
The rate of miscarriage among healthy women may be much lower, in fact—
around 14.0 percent.5 Further, in many cases, “early miscarriage” is not always
properly speaking the loss of a human life. Some cases of spontaneous abortion
are the result of grave abnormalities and serious deficiencies in the reproductive
process, ultimately from incomplete fertilization. Thus, in these cases, which may
account for the majority of spontaneous early miscarriages, a human being has not
been formed and so a human being does not die, since conception itself has failed
to be completed.
However, given some percentage of loss of actual human embryos, is there a
moral obligation to prevent such losses? It is possible that efforts could be made with
microsurgery or some other kind of intervention that might save human embryos
that would spontaneously miscarry, but almost certainly such treatments would be
at great expense and could prove an excessive burden on all those involved while
promising little hope of success.
Not attempting to save the life of the embryo in this context simply does not
indicate a tacit belief that this is not a human being and has no significant intrinsic
value. Just as there is no moral requirement to make extraordinary efforts to attempt
to restore health to elderly human beings, we need not make extraordinary efforts to
attempt to restore health to human beings in their embryonic state. An affirmation of
the dignity of all human life simply does not imply that one must always make every
effort to save every human life, regardless of the burdens involved or the likelihood
of success. Even though every human life has intrinsic value, as noted earlier, it does
not follow that every proposed treatment is worthwhile or valuable.
In addition, and unlike the case of the elderly dying, we characteristically
have no knowledge that this woman bearing this human being within her is having
a miscarriage right now. We are normally more concerned about the death of a wellknown neighbor than the death of an unknown person thousands of miles away,
so embryonic death at an early stage is generally less alarming than the death of a
prenatal human being later in pregnancy.
If we did know exactly who was going to have a miscarriage and when, and
if we had effective and nonburdensome ways to save this endangered life, then the
Ronald H. Gray and Ling Yu Wu, “Subfertility and Risk of Spontaneous Abortion,”
American Journal of Public Health 90.9 (September 2000): 1452–1454.
5
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pro-life view would entail that we would have a prima facie obligation to try to save
the human being in utero, and indeed a great many people would vigorously try to
do this—including many people who suffer from infertility problems.
Recently, McMahan also authored “Challenges to Human Equality,” in which he
explored the philosophical basis for attributing equal rights or equal dignity to mature,
healthy human beings (Journal of Ethics, June 2008). Although controversy remains
about the moral status of embryonic, fetal, and newborn human beings, all other
human beings are normally held to be equal in moral worth. Unjust killing of these
human beings is held to be equally wrong (the equal wrongness thesis), regardless
of whether the victim is young or old, stupid or intelligent, virtuous or vicious.
Two problems arise for this view, which McMahan calls “liberal egalitarianism.” The separation problem refers to the difficulty of ascribing higher moral status
to all humans than is had by all nonhuman animals, some of which may function
at a higher rational level than some humans.6 McMahan believes that this problem
cannot be solved, and that achievement of higher psychological capacities, and not
species membership, is relevant in determining moral status. The equality problem
refers to the evident inequality among human beings in terms of their rationality
and moral achievement. Achievement in reasoning and in moral development varies
tremendously even among healthy, mature human beings. How can we consider most
human beings to have equal moral status if they are so evidently unequal in terms
of the properties that grant moral status?
One alternative offered by Rahul Kumar, in his review essay on McMahan’s The
Ethics of Killing, is to ground moral worth not on individual achievement in the moral
or rational realm, but rather on membership in a rational kind (“Permissible Killing
and the Irrelevance of Being Human,” Journal of Ethics, June 2008). McMahan
agrees that the nature of the being in question should determine the moral status
which that being enjoys, but McMahan suggests that the human fetus does not yet
have a rational nature. In his 2008 article, McMahan asks,
Why should the morality of an act of killing be governed by the kind of respect
that is appropriate for a nature that the individual killed does not have now but
may have later, though only if it is not killed? Why should an act of killing
not be governed instead by due consideration for the nature of the individual
at the time of action (or of the death, if it occurs later)?
Eric D. Perl offers one way of taking into account that human beings have moral
r esponsibilities to nonhumans that are significant and yet differ from what is due to humans.
“‘Every Life Is a Thought’: The Analogy of Personhood in Neoplatonism,” Philosophy &
Theology 18:1 (2006): 143–167 (see abstracts). Perl grounds the moral status of a being in
its metaphysical nature and rejects a simple dichotomy between reason and nature. What he
offers instead is an ordered, hierarchical analogy of personhood in which every being merits
consideration in terms of the kind of being that it is. Typically, the debate about moral status
dichotomously posits rational “persons” on the one hand and material beings (nonpersons)
on the other. Reason, the realm of persons, is set against the material realm of nonpersons.
This assumption, together with a denial of nature, leads to both the “separation problem”
and the “equality problem” faced by McMahan. Perl’s article does not, however, explicitly
take on the challenge of justifying human equality.
6
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These questions reflect a misunderstanding of the meaning of something having
a nature, at least as understood by most pro-life advocates. The human fetus will
never get a different nature, even if eventually this human being is a mature, healthy
adult. A human fetus develops in accordance with the nature he or she already has.
Similarly, a human being does not become male or female only when reproduction
becomes physically possible at puberty. The ability to act in a distinctly male or
female way in reproduction comes only at the flowering maturity of human development, but being male or female is not only a necessary condition for this exercise but
also a fundamental fact of the nature of the being in question from the beginning
of life. Similarly, it is not that the human embryo is internally directed toward the
development of a rational nature, as McMahan supposes, but rather that the human
embryo already has a rational nature in virtue of which development of rational
functioning, if it takes place, is made possible.
McMahan holds that for the natural kind, or the species membership, to be
relevant for the recognition of moral status, there must be a morally significant
sense in which the present nature of a radically impaired human being is internally
directed toward rationality. This, again, is to misconstrue the meaning of nature as
used by those with whom he disagrees. A mentally handicapped human being has
a rational nature—presently, currently, and actually—so long as he or she is alive.
In virtue of the human body and in virtue of how we diagnose pathology, the orientation toward reason remains even in cases of where a human being suffers from
radical mental handicap.
First, as James Reichmann has pointed out, the human body is characterized
by a structural openness and extreme flexibility which enables the human body,
through habit and training, to properly adapt to and shape its environment.7 Both
instinct and physical structure limit nonhuman animals to a small range of activities.
The human person lives in a wild diversity of ways made possible by the mind,
yes, but also by the human body’s flexibility. The human body, even aside from the
brain, is itself shaped by its intrinsic connection to reason’s flexibility in the face of
changing circumstances.
Second, it is in virtue of his or her rational nature that we can diagnosis a human
being as mentally handicapped. If the human being in question was not a member of
a rational kind, then the mental function exhibited would not count as diminished,
but rather as normal or perhaps even above normal. Indeed, we already make use of
a species-specific account of flourishing when practicing medicine both in terms of
diagnosing illness and in terms of the moral imperative to attempt, where feasible,
to treat pathological conditions.8

James B. Reichmann, Philosophy of the Human Person (Chicago: Loyola University
Press, 1985): 186–189.
8
Daniel P. Sulmasy, “Dignity and Bioethics: History, Theory, and Selected Applications” in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council
on Bioethics (Washington, DC: US Independent Agencies and Commissions, 2008),
469–501.
7

190

Notes & Abstracts
In terms of the equality problem, pushed by questions posed by Tim Mulgan,9
McMahan expresses skepticism about the possibility of basing the equal moral worth
of human persons on properties that are unequal among human persons, such as
psychological capacities or ethical achievement. He notes,
All this leaves me profoundly uncomfortable. It seems virtually unthinkable
to abandon our egalitarian commitments, or even to accept that they might be
justified only in some indirect way—for example, because it is for the best,
all things considered, to treat all people as equals and to inculcate the belief
that all are indeed one another’s moral equals, even though in reality they
are not. Yet the challenges to the equal wrongness thesis, which is a central
element of liberal egalitarian morality, support Mulgan’s skepticism about
the compatibility our all-or-nothing egalitarian beliefs with the fact that the
properties on which our moral status appears to supervene are all matters of
degree. It is hard to avoid the sense that our egalitarian commitments rest on
distressingly insecure foundations (July 2008).

McMahan himself recognizes how “dangerously invidious” it would be, both
socially and politically, to publicly deny the fundamental equality of a group of
human persons. Perhaps, having more fully understood the logical implications of
the “pro-choice” position, McMahan might recoil from his premises and reconsider
the entire project of justifying private, lethal choices.
Christopher K aczor, Ph.D.
Loyola Marymount University
Los Angeles, California

Tim Mulgan, “Critical Notice of The Ethics of Killing,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2004): 443–460.
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